The German Sniper: 1914-1945 Review

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(More customer reviews)Author Peter Senich made his reputation as a sniping authority with this book. From its early beginning in the trenches of WWI, Senich describes the equipment, camouflage, weapons and tactics of the German Army. He makes a detailed examination of the rifles and the multitude of scopes, mounting systems for both wars and to a limited extend, supressor systems and infrared sighting units.
Senich does not neglect to provide the combat experience of snipers who fought the Red Army and their observations are invaluable today. However, no comparable account is given for German soldiers who fought the allies on the Western Front.
In an all too brief chapter, Senich also delves into the Soviet sniping experience and his text includes a translation of the role of the sniper in the infantry platoon/company. Unfortunately, he does not address the effectiveness of the Red Army sniper nor the propaganda so thoroughly dismissed by Shore (See, "With British Snipers to the Reich).
While the author acknowledges individuals who assisted him, a historian may be disappointed since the book lacks meaningful references. For a sniping enthusiast, this book is an invaluable resource. A collector of Mauser rifles will find the information and photos in this book very useful in identifying the many variations of German sniper rifles.

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The complete story of Germany's sniping arms development through both World Wars. Presents more than 600 photos of Mauser 98s, Selbstladegewehr 41s and 43s, optical sights by Goerz, Zeiss, etc., plus German snipers in action. An exceptional hardcover collector's edition for serious military historians everywhere.

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Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II Review

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(More customer reviews)The title and subtitle of Jörg Muth's Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II is a mouthful. It is deceptive, for it may give the initial impression that this is a work of narrow specialization and of limited breadth. Yet what readers will find is a book with a most ambitious scope; one that demystifies the burning question any serious student of WWII must wonder: How is it the Wehrmacht could consistently prevail, even against the most staggering odds? A question which becomes even more compelling when contrasted with the too often plodding and pedestrian performance of the Wehrmacht's American adversaries. Until this book, I did not have a ready answer. In his most painstakingly researched and well-annotated book, Mr. Muth provides the central and missing pieces of this puzzle: how, paradoxically, a society which can be accurately characterized by a militarized, evermore (from 1933 onward) authoritarian order, produced a military which can also be accurately characterized by dynamic and creative thinking, a ready grasp of the potential of new technologies, and the importance of individual initiative. And how a liberal, democratic state produced a military characterized by rigidity of thinking; one beholden to obsolescent concepts, and where the initiative of its officers was actively repressed. Read Mr. Muth's book. You will have a far more clear understanding of how and why each army performed the way it did after than before: ...The Consequences for World War II. Indeed!
Highly recommended.

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In Command Culture, Jörg Muth examines the different paths the United States Army and the German Armed Forces traveled to select, educate, and promote their officers in the crucial time before World War II. Muth demonstrates that the military education system in Germany represented an organized effort where each school and examination provided the stepping stone for the next. But in the United States, there existed no communication about teaching contents or didactical matters among the various schools and academies, and they existed in a self chosen insular environment. American officers who finally made their way through an erratic selection process and past West Point to the important Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, found themselves usually deeply disappointed, because they were faced again with a rather below average faculty who forced them after every exercise to accept the approved "school solution."Command Culture explores the paradox that in Germany officers came from a closed authoritarian society but received an extremely open minded military education, whereas their counterparts in the United States came from one of the most democratic societies but received an outdated military education that harnessed their minds and limited their initiative. On the other hand, German officer candidates learned that in war everything is possible and a war of extermination acceptable. For American officers, raised in a democracy, certain boundaries could never be crossed.This work for the first time clearly explains the lack of audacity of many high ranking American officers during World War II, as well as the reason why so many German officers became perpetrators or accomplices of war crimes and atrocities or remained bystanders without speaking up. Those American officers who became outstanding leaders in World War II did so not so much because of their military education, but despite it.

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Fighting Techniques of a Japanese Infantryman 1941-1945: Training, Techniques and Weapons Review

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(More customer reviews)If you think al Qaeda is bad news, let me introduce you to Imperial Japan, a xenophobic society of death-worshipping nationalist religious fanatics. Leo Daugherty describes the Japanese soldier in 95 pages divided into six chapters:
--martial tradition
--induction and training
--military organization
--tactics
--individual weapons and equipment
--Japanese infantry division support weapons
Want to know what motivated the Imperial Japanese soldier to hunker down in a spider hole clutching an unexploded American aircraft bomb and a hammer? That soldier was going to blow up an American tank-and himself. The Kamikaze came about when military defeat and lack of war material meshed with the duty of the Japanese soldier to die in battle-if necessary, by killing himself. Daugherty wrote that the state religion of Shinto and the code of Bushido incorporated in 1867. Emperor Hirohito was considered a god, and anything done in service to that god was good. The national goal was unifying the world-under Japanese leadership. The soldier's code, Senjinkun, was pounded into already-prepared recruits. A military junta ruled Japan and this junta prepared the Japanese people for total war. On page 21 a table lists the year-long conscript training cycle-but this wasn't the beginning of military training. School children were indoctrinated early. "By 1934, more than one-third, or 915,000, of Japan's young men in the appropriate age bracket studied and drilled at these youth training centers."
No wonder part of the Japanese Imperial Guards rebelled when Emperor Hirohito announced Japan's capitulation!
Japan had no jungles to train in, yet the Japanese soldier was an excellent jungle fighter. This was the result of long, thorough training. The Japanese soldier was trained to fight at night as a means of overcoming enemy forces superior in numbers and firepower. The bayonet and hand grenade were preferred over the rifle-especially for close combat in the dark.
I found the descriptions of weapons and equipment brief but useful. Many criticize the Japanese for having poor small arms, for lacking a submachine gun, for "over reliance" on the bayonet. Actually, Japanese rifles and light machine guns were quite effective. Japanese pistols weren't, and the Type 100 submachine gun was a failure. The United States didn't really have a good submachine gun either, and its Browning Automatic Rifle was no match for a light machine gun. The famed knee mortar provided close-in 50mm shellfire on enemy positions. Oh, perhaps a semiautomatic rifle like America's M-1 Garand would have been nice-provided Japan's industry could keep her soldiers supplied with ammunition. Unrestricted air and submarine warfare by the United States went a long way towards insuring that there was never enough ammunition for the Japanese defenders.
At the division level (roughly 20,000 men-on paper), Japan shortchanged its soldiers on heavy weapons. No matter-there was a decided lack of motor transport in the Japanese armed forces. Couldn't haul artillery pieces and ammunition even if they had the hardware-a severe lack of petroleum was one reason Japan attacked the Western nations. Against lightly-equipped Chinese formations, Japanese units had ample firepower. When confronted by Soviet armored formations, Japan lost a chunk of Manchuria during 1939 in the Khalkyn Gol Incident. Initially, Japan crushed more-heavily armed British Commonwealth and American troops, but by 1943 the shoe was on the other foot. Eventually, islands such as Iwo Jima would bear the full brunt of American air power and naval gunfire unaided-it would just be the Japanese infantryman and a handful of artillery pieces buying time. Like the Vietnamese Communists of 40 years ago and al Qaeda today, the Japanese soldier believed it was just a matter of time before the soft Americans gave up and crawled back home. Given the disparity in divisional artillery and in tanks, this was quite the leap of faith!
Japan declared war on the whole world and her infantrymen did more than humanly possible. "Fighting Techniques of a Japanese Infantryman" describes in general terms how the Japanese infantry achieved this, and the tools that Japan gave its soldiers.


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This in-depth analysis of the tactics and equipment used by Japan's infantry between 1941 and 1945 includes descriptions of their training and how that training influenced their success or failure on the battlefield, where after 1943 the Japanese fought a skillful and brave defense against overwhelming odds and firepower. Full-color artworks show weapons and equipment to full effect, while tactics and fighting techniques are explained by means of detailed line artworks.

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